Liberalism And Its Rhetorical Limitations
－Liberalism and Its Acultural and Ahistorical Conditions－

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ABSTRACT

The pursuit of multicultural coexistence in the era of globalization presumes the primacy of liberal principles. However, the liberalism as a political theory faces contradiction of itself forming a culture with a history that is excluding of other conflicting cultures and historical contingencies. This exclusion poses theoretical and actual problems to the liberal principles of multicultural coexistence because some voices, experiences, and values get silenced in liberal construction of global discourse. This paper highlights the presupposition that liberalism, when enacted, promotes *ahistorical* and *acultural* conditions. Multiculturalism, when uncritically approached with liberal principles, may work against in an attainment of global peace by fueling, instead of bridging, ongoing miscommunication between groups with different/diverse historical conditions.

【キーワード：リベラリズム，グローバリズム，公正】
【Keyword: Liberalism, Globalism, Fairness】

In a post-modernity era marked with desperate attempts to alleviate and negotiate potentially destructive conflicts in a global scale, we seem to enjoy new hopes with the revival of modernity that promises to recuperate its failures signaled for the past century —through readjusting, rearticulating and successfully enacting the tenets of liberalism at global level, provided that such doing is supported in an organized matter by most individual people—under the new consciousness of themselves as citizens of the world—as well as by most important societal structures—under the spell and principles of liberal doctrines.

A most salient characteristic of liberalism is that it prioritizes what is right over what is good.[i] A liberal state, Michael Sandel elaborates, should respect varying conceptions of the good life while preventing one's conception of the good life from infringing upon a different conception held by others in a society. This is to say that a liberal society should not promote a prevalent conception of the good. Instead, a liberal society should promote a *structure* that ensures justice by permitting all people to choose to direct their lives with their own conception of the good. It seems thus reasonable to support liberalism as the appropriate doctrine in the efforts to attain a democratic society by generating a sense of global citizenship and constructing the global governance at the end of ideological struggle.

With the falling of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s marking the end of Cold War, Francis Fukuyama's sensational article titled "The End of History?"

published in 1989 has received a great attention. Fukuyama coined the moment as one in which Western liberal democracy triumphed over its ideological oppositions—imperialism, fascism, and communism—and as the *end* of history. Fukuyama asserts that the victory of liberal democracy would bring the history of *struggles over political ideologies to the end*—in Hegelian terms— and the world will see the "universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government."[ii] Indeed, the Cold War's finale made it seem that global governance increasingly comes to be a real possibility to a degree more than ever before in human history. Exemplifying such sociopolitical atmosphere, there have been the series of conferences organized by the United Nations after the fall of the Soviet Union to brainstorm collectively on issues that are not merely *inter-national,* but *global* in scale. In fact, the last decade of the twentieth century has seen many of such efforts: Environmental Conference (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), Human Rights Conference (Vienna, 1993), the Women's Conference (Beijing, 1995), and Framework Convention of Climate Change (Kyoto, 1997) to name a few.[iii]

However, the movement toward global governance has undermined, if not excluded, those who cannot accommodate to and/or benefit from the current reconfiguring of the system. For example, the United Nations has dispatched 56 Peace Keeping Operations by the year 2002 since its installment in 1948, of which nearly 70 percent were dispatched after the fall of the Soviet Union. It coincided with the period the world has seen

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the immanence of global governance and attempts to universalizing Western liberal democracy.[iv] Furthermore, dramatic developments of global terrorism suggest that there is strong resistance to globalization under Western liberal principles. These phenomena can be said to be the indicators of great instability developed in the process of democratization and in the efforts of installing liberal principles at the foundations of the new world order.[v] The insurgences springing from instability and social unrest talk quite contrary to the premise that creating a sense of global citizenship achieves universal prosperity and stability for all individuals in the world.

The apparent failure in universalizing the Western liberal democracy suggests that there may be serious shortcomings in the articulations of liberalism as a political theory. Liberal democratic principles have been appealing to a great number of people as they—at least at rhetorical level—aim to ensure everybody's own mode of living. However, since liberal principles have so far neither prevailed as a political ideology nor prevented the great instability around the world, many have already recognized the need to explore and analyze the nature of liberalism and the social and political contexts which its rhetoric allow, particularly in the light of the developments that we witness today in the world. This paper builds upon the hypothesis that liberalism when engaged to practical ends in the organization of the society, cannot retain unaltered its identity "as a political conception of justice rather than as part of comprehensive moral doctrine."[vi] Liberalism, when enacted in an actual frame of society, in fact, forms *a cultural identity* of its own, which distinguishes itself by cultivating a certain myth of individuality. Therefore, liberalism, once enacted, is no longer a political theory but a cultural discourse, which emphasizes a discourse of individuality and modernity. Specifically, this cultural identity, which becomes under the influence of liberalism, upholds the principles of ethical individuality as elaborated by Ronald Dworkin in determination of all social and cultural practices.[vii] At the inception of liberalism as a political theory, the principles of ethical individuality were to function as a way to reclaim and escape *power*, which could only be accomplished by transcending historically situated identity—hence theorizing that liberalism is proper only when it remains an *ahistorical* discourse.

This paper aims to illustrate that liberalism enacted slips out of its theoretical formulations and construes a culture. Liberalism construes what Benedict Anderson calls an imagined community of its own by generating its own specific *habitus*—with a whole baggage of myths and biased discourses.[viii] Liberalism cannot sustain the

liberal political principles advocated to reflect universal desire and to ensure the development in harmony of global community. This paper demonstrates that liberalism cannot sustain itself to remain a political theory; and with this very incongruence lays the reason why the current globalization movement generates much greater instability in the world instead of supporting the hopes to alleviate them.

As a political theory, the liberalism emphasizes the view that people are free and equal *in the state of nature*. However, this premise is never tested nor actualized. Ronald Dworkn insists on the feature of liberalism to ensure that the lives of all persons should flourish because "it is intrinsically, objectively, and equally important that human beings lead successful lives"[ix] in a society that is liberal. Indeed, liberalism hardly supports prioritizing social efficiency at the expenses of the rights of individual persons in a society, while they do accept the limiting of individual liberty—the concept of negative liberty—to some degree, in order to attain liberal equality in a society at large.[x] It is a matter central to most liberal theorists to question whether political authority (which carries an agency to define and exercise negative liberty) in a liberal society can be justified, and what would constitute political authority justifiable to all citizens in a society.

For a classical instance of how organizing the foundations of liberal society is argued in theory we can refer to John Rawl's book, *Justice as Fairness*. Rawls proposes that the principles of justice would sustain the liberal condition in which "[e]ach person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all."[xi] Rawls and other contractarian liberals accepts certain inequalities on the basis of difference principles when "[inequalities] are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and…they are to be the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society."[xii] The principles of justice are thus applied in the well-ordered society with "a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons."[xiii] In order to specify what construes a fair system of cooperation, Rawls introduces the *original position* in which persons interested in securing greater primary goods are conceptually kept unaware of their conditions and talents by a veil of ignorance. It is supposed that in the original position, people would stand on a fair grounds, free from all "historical advantages and accidental influences from the past…[affecting] an agreement on principles that are to regulate the basic structure from the present into the future."[xiv]

Those who challenge the contractarian liberalism often stress that the original position is in no way realistic even as a hypothetical condition and/or whether this original position could ever exist while all persons are never outside of the influence of both a community in which they reside and history from which meanings and identities are situated/constructed. Others argue that "[t]he question is not whether the original position could ever really exist, but whether the principles which would be chosen in it are likely to be fair, given the nature of the selection process."[xv] It is however important to draw attention to the fact that neither critiques seem to have any troubles with the main assumption that sustains the foundations of the original position: that is, the people should be *equal and free from contingencies* in the name of individual liberty being "intrinsically, objectively, and equally important"[xvi] to all persons.

It is rather difficult to resist the temptations of presuming individual liberty has transcendental value and it is common to all persons throughout time and space. Yet, I argue that it is only an assumption that is fundamentally held as the fact in liberalism. This assumption could reverse the status of liberalism exclusively as a political theory and challenges the tenet that liberalism can organize the world exactly because it transcends cultural biases and power games on two accounts: (1) liberalism enacted becomes inseparable of community of its own that shares *a particular conception of the good*, and (2) equality is a relational concept which, like any relation, can only be defined with respect to a particular system in which the factors that are supposed to be bound by the relationship *exist*. In other words, one cannot claim equality but with reference to some system in which there are specific criteria by which one can verify if two elements are in that relationship or not. Equality does not exist *ad absolutum*, that is, outside the specifics of a system, and thus there would not be any form of equality that transcends all systems.

Depending on the criteria established and on the system in which they exist, people can be seen and see themselves as equal or not. Interestingly enough, this little logic-language loop is true even when the *equality relationship* is defined: all elements are equal in the right of being themselves. However, with the act of establishing criteria to validate *equality* inevitably comes *history* (of the system, of the criteria and of the process of attaining the state of equality for all people). Also come the differing contingencies that liberal principles strive to transcend or sidetrack. Rawls, upon presenting the original position, considers historical advantages (and disadvantages) and talent (and lack thereof) as *contingent factors* in a liberal society. In fact, there is hardly

any argument on liberalism whether one's historical conditions and talents *are* indeed contingent. Since liberalism, particularly the one with Rawlsian vision of the contract, takes the standpoint that one's historical conditions and talents *are* contingent, there is no space for questioning in liberalism how such conditions are really contingent absent of any just reason for claiming any particularity of conditions in a society.

Therefore, it can be argued that considering one's historical advantages or talents as mere contingencies is more *an ethical choice* than *a natural fact*. I argue therefore that holding one's historically ascribed advantages/disadvantages and talents/no-talents as a mere contingency is in fact a *belief* and as such requires subscription to a particular ethical choice validated in the moral structure of liberalism. This moral structure would inevitably reflect a particular conception of the good, which contracts the foundational thesis of liberal principles to keep choices above the partisan biases, beliefs, and other historically conditioned factors in human society. Hence, it seems fair to suggest that liberalism cannot be enacted independently from a community of its own being and creating respectively, the community that would *subscribe to the belief* of holding one's historical advantages and talents as contingencies. This is, in other words, to emphasize that liberalism is inseparable from its community, and thus the principles of justice would hardly be neutral to or independent from *subsidizing* a certain conception of the good found in an existing society.

Liberalism, by not acknowledging their subsidizing *a certain conception* of good life, fails to recognize having its own imagined community with a history of its own: it is construed exclusively by allegiance to the generality and universality of Kantian ethics. That is, all persons are created equal in their benefit from fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These values are in fact rooted directly in the French conception of *nation* promoted with the Revolution of 1789, and the values have the characteristics to be considered inarguably universal to all humans since it was supposedly all persons who led the revolution against the King. Liberal society seems to require all persons to uphold one's *allegiance* to the *liberal political ideology* in front of all ethnic, racial, cultural, and other identities/conditions tied with the past or particular experiences (in the past); and thus it can be said that liberal principles implicitly but bluntly promote prioritizing *ahistorical allegiance* above all existing historical allegiances, which are simply referred as contingencies. In this respect, liberalism itself assumes a certain culture that endorses ahistorical individuality

through active ignorance of one's historical conditions.

In *The Racial Contract*, Charles Mills finds that the initial social contract has excluded non-mainstream populations/elements like Blacks, women, children, and poor from taking a part in the social contract.[xvii] The political structure that emerged from this social contract is arguably inherent of discriminatory to (or misrepresenting of) those who were kept outside of the contract. Mill's elaboration on the racial contract adds to the point that contractarian liberalism is not so much about freedom of persons as it can equally be about political subordination of individuals in a society under the contract—because liberal contract also assumes the political obedience and the negative freedom as parameters for individual liberty in a society. While liberalism is inseparable of its own community sharing a particular conception of the good—which has its base on Kantian generality and universality of persons, it is rather questionable whether what is left to people in the original position under a veil of ignorance would really be fair and free of contingencies.

I have discussed so far that Rawlsian contractarian liberalism relies on the original position where a veil of ignorance "conceals from them [parties] all knowledge of their individual characteristics and their social position"[xviii] that are contingent in a society. However, even when all contingencies are removed completely, the outcome of social contract with the unanimously agreed principles of justice would most possibly generate another set of contingencies immediately when the social contract forms a community of its own. It is thus essential to note that having a community of its own means a historical dimension that in fact is constitutive. Therefore, liberalism, by being organically related with a community of its own and thus with a history of its own, can no more be regarded essentially as a political theory transcending to all persons.

In the case of the United States, it can be argued that the pursuit of liberal society by construing "the city upon the hill" or by pursuing the Frontier West and American Southwest would leave out most people who are not underwriters of the Constitution representing the nation's political ideology. Historically, those people who were left out from the original social contract have rarely benefited, but instead suffered by the construction of the city upon the hill or from the spatial expansion under the name of extending liberal principles or Manifest Destiny, to simply put it. It is also notable that the history of any particular group—cultural, ethnic, racial, or otherwise defined—in fact may come contradictory or even challenging to *ahistoricity* of liberal identity held as prominent in the United States.

Paradoxically, the Constitution comes to define America as the space where people can immigrate in order to preserve and pursue their beliefs, desires, and cultural particularities that are threatened or endangered by other historically verified discourses in the Old World. Will Kymlicka calls attention that the defending group-differentiated rights (for minorities) do not stand contradictory to the liberal principles because the principles of justice would require the rights of citizenship to be dependent on cultural group membership. By this, Kymlicka means the members of national minority groups can be justly incorporated into the liberal political community when "group-differentiated rights, powers, status or immunities, beyond the common rights of citizenship"[xix] are acknowledged. The principles of justice, therefore, must provide an account not limited to the rights and obligations of citizens, but they must also consider an account of who are the citizens and how they come to be incorporated into the current political community. The Constitution therefore should take a role forming of guarantee that the melting pot would *not* be enforced upon citizens considering the historical construction about the *body* of citizens in a political community.

And yet, becoming American or a citizen of a liberal society by allegiance to a principle and upholding a harmonious democratic society in fact causes that the American identity or liberal identity is indeed possible only by leaving behind, discarding, and not manifesting *with priority* the particularities of own culture or group specific characteristics since such individual particularities are viewed as the product of contingent conditions. As the underwriters of Constitution—which is a social contract codified—did rhetorically declared their terminating ties with Old World and defining their moral and political righteousness in the *Declaration of Independence*, American identity still carries a sense of independence from all contingencies that are cultural, linguistic, religious (or secular), and historical particularities. In some sense however, the Constitution based identity—or American liberal identity on the basis of contract—could result in restricting the very liberty and pursuit of happiness—the individual conception of the good life—because it failed to recognize the historical variables of persons in front of the Constitution, which supposedly embodies Kantian generality and universality perceiving our nature as free and equal rational being.

As communitarian liberals argue, what constitutes desirable life, liberty, and happiness is contextual and highly depending on one's political and moral environment. Individuals are not mere atoms in a

society, but they are closely situating and also situated in their community. The particularity of individual becomes a victim of what supposedly universal and common (and therefore held as superior) values, and the particularity for minorities would also become victim, as they would remain silenced and less visible in public sphere, when universality and generality of large social sphere are cherished. Alasdair MacIntyre writes the disconnection between one's historical space and moral identity in a society upholding liberal individualism:

> From the standpoint of individualism I am what I myself choose to be. I can always, if I wish to, put in question what are taken to be the merely contingent social features of my existence. I may biologically be my father's son; but I cannot be held responsible for what he did unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to assume such responsibility. I may legally be a citizen of a certain country; but I cannot be held responsible for what my country does or has done unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to assume such responsibility. Such individualism is expressed by those modern Americans who deny a responsibility for effects of slavery upon black Americans, saying "I never owned any slaves." It is more subtly the standpoint of those modern Americans who accept a nicely calculated responsibility for such effects measured precisely by the benefits they themselves as individuals have indirectly received from slavery. In both cases "being an American" is not in itself taken to be part of the moral identity of the individual.[xx]

It is indeed possible to say that the benefactors of liberal society are often limited to those who have privilege to sustain no or very little attachment to those contingencies in a historical space, so they can demonstrate their strong commitment to political ideology.

This is to say that by claiming *ahistoricity* of liberal principles and individual autonomy, the society and its citizens could remain sanctioned from evaluating their historical, cultural, and political responsibilities of construing the existing inequalities. Those conditions are rather considered as individual variables under the social contract drafted with liberal principles. It is as if pressing a reset button of a computer game, a liberal society is somewhat perceived to remove history's roles from all experiences—the experiences without historical condition can therefore remain contingent. In such

society, those who sustain any cultural, ethnic, racial, sexual, and any forms of allegiances asides from the political ideology—liberal principles—tenets may not escape from the environment in which their conception of the good is being questioned and/or violated. Therefore, those who sustain any cultural, ethnic, racial, sexual, and any particular experiences are often considered *guilty of their allegiance* to something other than the political ideology that is liberal.

Even though the articulations of liberalism as a political theory were an attempt to constructing a community with flexible and fluid boundaries—the liberal society is supposed to accomplish being the first all-inclusive community, liberalism can hardly remain itself as a political theory when enacted in practice for the three reasons, as discussed earlier: (1) liberalism entails theoretical contractions by sustaining one conception of the good—such as the one demonstrated in the tradition of Kantian categorical moral reasoning and its universality—as superior to others; (2) liberalism cannot evade from organizing a community of its own, which is bounded by cultural and historical bias and power structures of its own; and (3) although the intention of liberalism is to blur boundaries making it an extensively inclusive society, like any community construed by definitional texts—in our case these texts are the tenants of liberal doctrines to which all citizens members of the community must abide—the libertarian community ends up identified by its boundaries thus inevitably leaving out some people. This violates the survival of the community itself, in as much as it defines itself as a community that has the mechanisms to unboundedly extend inclusiveness. Liberalism fails once enacted because it is a political theory projecting *ahistorical* (but not anti-historical) discourse.

The impossibility for liberalism to remain ahistorical discourse comes from the fact that it carries its own language and values that are historically situated. The process of globalization, for example, creates problems for those populations, societies and cultures that cannot participate and/or benefit from the process. Rapid shift to globalization demands those external to the trend to accommodate their institutional design to adapt more comprehensive structure by way of removing their cultural codes—culturally and historically established practice—to be codified. Through this codification, all historical and cultural practices that can be codified to be understood by global others, and those cannot be codified to be put into contingent factors in a global community. Failure to adapt the kind of structural organization demanded in globalization therefore leads the nation to be a failed state in a global community.

Similarly, liberalism imposing democratization of political community in order to ensure individual persons' equal and free rational autonomy could result into a major instability of a nation because it would remove the traditional, historical, and cultural power that coheres the national structure. Therefore, it can be understood that liberalism when enacted in global context has resulted greater instability of the world because it failed to acknowledge historical and mythical structures that are holding an institution.

Will Kymlicka attempts to add complex historical evaluation on how and what have generated ethnic and cultural particularities in a nation (nation-state) in order to argue for group-differentiated rights for minorities. Because "political life has an inescapably national dimension",[xxi] Kymlicka takes the position of defending group-specific rights of minorities to project liberal justice for the individuals of minority group in a political community. It is possible to argue for pluralistic society within a nation-state, which withholds superiority to a particular conception of the good. However, it is hardly possible to apply in a global context where has multiple autonomous nation-states each with own conception of the good. Liberal principles are culturally bound applicable within a particular *habitus* with its own language, myths, and historical experiences. In other words, liberalism can hardly remain as a political theory because the liberalism itself is congruent to mythical individuality—human as a free and equal relational being able to make decision transcending from all contingencies and dispositions.

Even when individuals are in fact reaching a state in which they may be able to depart from their historical and mythical constraints to overcome, transcend and replace their cultural and historical positioning—identity—with completely *ahistorical* and *acultural* identity, it is hardly imaginable for us to desire a society with such individuals. As earlier quote of MacIntyre suggests, a liberal society, when it goes to extreme, would be full of individuals who hold no responsibility to their actions, as well as their future. In an ahistorical society, people's being there has nothing to do with how they come to such ahistorical society, no action would be acknowledged to make any effect to the society's future.

Thus, when applying this conception to global context, it would most likely generate Anglo-centric vision of the world represented in Samuel Huntington's infamous article, "The Clash of Civilizations?".[xxii] Published in 1993, when the Western liberal democracy faced its first phase of disappointment and frustration by increasing resistance and instability in the global

environment on the contrary to their initial belief of seeing *the end of history*, Huntington provides a comprehensive explanation to it by calling the idea that the world has seven blocks (eight when including Africa) of civilization, and they are incommunicable to each other. In other words, Huntington emphasizes the limits of applicability of liberal political principles outside civilization block. Instead of calling unpopular words like savages or uncivilized, Huntington's idea of civilization blocks stages different civilizations that are inherently incommunicable therefore naturally produces clash when crossing the line as we extend liberal political principles.

Charles Mills critiques the traditional characteristics of liberalism in *The Racial Contract* that "[t]he battle against this savagery is in a sense permanent as long as the savages continue to exist, contaminating (and being contaminated by) the non-Europeanized space around them."[xxiii] It seems that Huntington's thesis and the popularity it gained when the article came out—in fact indicate the limitations of liberalism as a political theory when built on the presumption that the primacy of human individuality is a universal tenet. This suggests the very reason why the current globalization movement when founded on the liberal political principles, has produced great instability. The questions we face now are those of defining state sovereignty and citizenship in general. The actual difficulties or impossibility of including all remain, since those who are often identified as non-citizen, second-class citizen, sub-citizen, as well as foreigners and aliens find themselves *othered* in the many aspects of social and civic life. Thinking of *sovereignty without identity* would be necessary in order to eliminate any forms of exclusion and to support liberalism to transcend its historical conditions.

However, the globalization currently ongoing under the liberal principles remains ignorant about illiberal realities behind the enactment of one's liberal discourse over other places in the world. It seems that the current globalization and its liberal rationality have been benefited from miscommunication, if not *dis-communication*, between those who subscribe to a particular liberal discourse being implemented and those who are in conflict with the historical presuppositions and cultural discourse embedded in predominant liberalism in contemporary politics of the globe.

It is still quite premature to draw this prediction, but I end this paper with cautioning that liberalism enacted may potentially construe a disastrous instability internationally. Liberalism offers no mechanism

to evaluate whatever presuppositions dominate a society claiming to be liberal. Furthermore, the liberalism enacted may also bleed greater apathy and disconnection of individuals internally within a liberal society as liberalism promotes prioritizing a present-oriented individuality over historicity of individuals. These phenomena should be carefully studies as the world turns toward peaceful and fair globalization; and this paper expresses a hope to highlight the immediate necessity to carefully evaluate the liberal discourses predominant in the world stages today.

References:

[i] Michael Sandel, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," *Political Theory*, no. 12 (1984).

[ii] Kenneth M. Jensen, ed., A *Look at "the End of History?"* (Washington D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace, 1990), 2.

[iii] The global governance seems to have gravitated not merely around political and economic structures, but lately targeting explicitly most aspects of the public sphere itself. The latter development has spawn growing mass manifestations springing from emotions and experiences that have been habitually used as signifiers to characterize cultural specificity, and are hereby today taken transcendentally out of the nation-state discourse. Of those public movements the manifestations of sympathy to the United States on 9-11 terrorist attacks, as well as the worldwide protests against the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq under the name of War Against Terrorism are remarkable examples of how the world spells out the reification of emotions and experiences that are drafted into signifiers today globally blurring the traditional boundaries of the nation-states.

[iv] Data here is provided online by 国際連合広報センター http://www.unic.or.jp/recent/act.htm (Last accessed: August 20, 2010).

[v] The last quarter of the twentieth century, there is a dramatic increase in number of democratic states from 35 to over 120 in the world. However, almost two-thirds of these democratic states have highly unstable political systems with uproar of ethnic, cultural, religious, and various other conflicts surfacing after the removal of dominant power.

[vi] John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA & London, UK: The Belknap Press, 2001), xvi.

[vii] Ronald Dworkin, "Do Liberty and Equality Conflict?" *Living as Equals*, ed. Paul Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 42-43.

[viii] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Press, 1983).

[ix] Dworkin, 42.

[x] Here, I do not include libertarian concept of liberalism presented by Robert Nozick. Libertarian liberalism tends to seek for absolute individual autonomy, which in turn results in denying the legitimacy of any authority externally present to a self. This take on liberalism is often guilty of leading anarchism as it denies any form of governing bodies that is external to individual self. Because this paper has no intention to deny the existence of state, society, culture, and other forms of human allegiances, it is justificatory to exclude libertarian liberalism arguments. For instance of libertarian liberalism, see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

[xi] Rawls, 42.

[xii] Ibid.

[xiii] Ibid., 14.

[xiv] Ibid., 16.

[xv] Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 63.

[xvi] Dworkin, 16.

[xvii] Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[xviii] Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 90.

[xix] Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 206.

[xx] Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 220.

[xxi] Kymlicka 1995, 194.

[xxii] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).

[xxiii] Mills, 47.

論文要旨

　グローバル化は、多様性との共生のあり方についての新しい方法論の必要性を提示した。未だグローバルな主体を規定するフレームワークが存在しない現在においては、多様な価値とその体系を承認する主体が存在しない。このため、多様な価値がグローバルな主体によって承認されるのではなく、多様性そのものに価値を付与するリベラリズムの価値体系は、グローバル時代の多様性の一つの方向性を示している。本論は、リベラリズムの価値体系が、他の価値体系と同様に、自らの価値に衝突する価値を排除することによって達成される矛盾を指摘する。グローバルな多様性の言説に見られるリベラリズムの原則が、私たちの多様性を構築する歴史的経験や文化的価値を看過する危険性を内包していることを示す。本論では、多文化主義やグローバル主義への無批判な姿勢が、リベラルな価値体系とそれに排除される価値体系との間に新しい紛争を形成する可能性をもつことを論じる。